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Abstract: 
The concept of state failure is complex, encompassing many aspects of the 
decline in a state, from its institutional and political capacities, to its social 
cohesion and economic performance. In the South Pacific, the term "failing" 
has been used to describe the Solomon Islands before the regional assistance 
mission RAMSI intervened. Its continued use to describe other countries in 
the region, such as Papua New Guinea or Fiji is controversial, mainly because 
the states of the South Pacific are generally considered much more peaceful 
than those in other regions labelled failing . Importantly, the geographical 
nature of the region itself provides a vastly different strategic context to 
African and European failing states which are often situated in landlocked 
geographies. It follows on that if Pacific Island states do experience aspects of 
failure (as opposed to being completely collapsed or failed) then their 
incapacities would breed unique security implications for the South Pacific 
region. This thesis aims to discern what those implications are for New 
Zealand policy in the South Pacific region. The method used will be to assess 
seven countries (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) and their degree to which they measure up against 
twelve indicators of state failure. These indicators have been borrowed from 
the Fund for Peace ' s annual Failed States Index (with their permission) and 
they provide the structure for the assessment. 
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Executive Summary: 
• This paper aims to identify the aspects of state failure within South 
Pacific states and to distinguish their implications for New Zealand's 
security policy in the region. 
• The framework for this investigation is part of the Fund for Peace 's 
methodology for their Failed States Index - namely their 12 indicators 
• The countri es included in this investigation are Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
These countries have been chosen for the wide variety of cultures and 
soc ieties they represent in the Melanesian and Polynesian sub-regions. 
They also represent different political and economic situations that 
provides contrast among the countries in the research. 
• Overall, the indicators show that the assessed South Pacific countries 
are weakened by various levels of corruption, and poor perfom1ing 
economies that are vulnerable and dependent on ODA and in most 
cases remittances. 
• This carries over into state performance; as state institutions are 
weakened and become more prone to corruption, the delivery of public 
services becomes uneven or deteriorates, and there is a general 
inability to contain the detrimental effects of population growth, 
demographic pressures, or alleviate poverty. 
• In Melanesian countries like the Solomon Islands and Papua New 
Guinea, a mixture of demographics, poverty, cultural and political 
factionalism, corruption and state institutional incapacity provide a 
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social milieu where violence and conflict has become (or was) a staple 
of life. 
• In countries such as Vanuatu and Fiji, there are significant, and in 
some cases growing, indicators of poverty and poor government 
administration. Both states have had, or are currently having problems 
between civil and military establishments. 
• Tonga and Samoa both rate relatively highly when it comes to 
development indicators, and both are very stable politically. However, 
their heavy dependence on remittances as well as aid (like other PICs) 
underlines weak and stagnant economies. Furthermore, Tonga's 
violent and destructive riots of November 2006 destroyed an illusion 
of peace and demonstrated that Polynesian populations do have the 
capacity for violence on the scale seen in Honiara of April 2006. 
• Tuvalu paints a different picture of a state struggling with its 
demographic and geographical realities. Poverty levels have increased 
over the years, and poverty in regards to infrastructure and 
opportunities characterise the nature of the development challenges 
facing the small Tuvaluan government, which itself is subject to bouts 
of low-level factionalism and political instability. 
• These indicators have a cyclical and cumulative effect upon one 
another, where, for instance, corruption and poverty will facilitate and 
exacerbate increasingly unstable social and political environments, 
which in tum will exacerbate corruption and poverty, resulting in an 
increasingly weakened state. 
• The key regional security concerns that stem from these aspects of 
failure within these states are: 
Xll 
Internal instability and humanitarian emergencies stemming from 
conflict or natural disasters. 
Increasing transnational criminal activities in the region, including 
illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking, people smuggling, and 
illegal fishing, carried out by extra-regional criminal organisations 
and terrorist groups. 
The proliferation of guns. 
Political instability from strained civil-military relations having 
political and economic effects for the wider region. 
• Subsequently , the fear of state fai lure has dri ven states such as 
Australia and New Zealand towards a new paradigm in assessing 
threats to regional security, focusing more upon state capacity building 
as means to address these threats. This does call upon greater 
involvement in the region by New Zealand and Australia, but this 
involvement has to be balanced against respecting countries 
sovereignty and constitutionalism. 
• Intervention is an indication of the extent to which New Zealand and 
Australia are willing to get involved in situations of conflict in PlCSs, 
but it is an extremely drawn out and expensive commitment that is 
fraught with risks, as has been demonstrated by the Solomon Islands 
expenence. 
• Regionalism is becoming an increasingly important vehicle for 
regional capacity building and this is evident in the wide scope 
envisaged in the Pacific Plan. But regionalism also involves heavy 
engagement from New Zealand and Australia, because without them 
there would be no impetus or resources to allow regional initiatives to 
achieve full implementation. 
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• Other important aspects of capacity building are New Zealand's 
bilateral development and governance assistance programmes which 
are targeted at structural capacity building as a means to resolve 
conflict peacefully and to alleviate poverty. While ODA has been a 
significant pillar of New Zealand engagement in the South Pacific for 
decades, the drivers behind it, its delivery, and its aims have evolved 
over recent years to meet the change in security perceptions. 
• The implications for New Zealand's defence policy have meant a 
broadening in the role of the NZDF in the South Pacific, as well as 
requiring that New Zealand's own defence forces go through capacity 
building. Additionally, cooperation programmes are increasingly 
important in improving the professionalism and discipline in PICs' 
defence and police forces in order to lessen their potential as sources 
of political and social instability. 
• Police are becoming much more needed in the region, and New 
Zealand's capacities and programmes will need to gradually reflect 
this evolution. 
• More research needs to be done on the social, economic and political 
impacts of Asia in the region. In particular, the impacts from the 
influence of the two China's bidding for South Pacific countries' 
recognition, the impacts from Asian criminal organisations spreading 
into the region, and also the impacts of foreign investment from these 
countries' companies, particularly in regards to the extent they 
facilitate corruption and social instability. 
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Introduction: 
2006 proved to be an eventful year regionally and domestically for Pacific 
Island countries (PICs). For instance, there were the Solomon Islands riots in 
April after the Parliamentary elections. The riots destroyed most of Chinatown 
in Honiara and were blamed on Taiwanese influence. In September, King 
Tupou IV of Tonga died, his seat has been taken over by his son, the 
controversial Crown Prince. In November, there were riots in Tonga, that 
destroyed a large portion of Nuku 'alofa and were perceived to be caused when 
Parliament had been closed for the end of the year without addressing the 
important issue of democratic reform. Finally, the whole world watched the 
Fijian coup unravelling in Fijian time, hesitantly but inevitable. 
These events have played out against a number of complex trends and issues 
that have been festering and subverting development and political progress in 
PICs for years. In some academic and political discussions, PICs have come to 
be seen as reflecting trends and issues that are found in other struggling states 
around the world, so that terms like "Africanisation" and "failing" have been 
used to describe the region and particular states. The use of such dramatic 
terms has stimulated discussion over the development challenges and 
governance issues prevalent in many PICs. 
The term "failing state" has gained a high level of credence in academic 
circles world wide and has been used to describe the condition of a number of 
countries around the world such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. The concept of 
state failure is complex, encompassing many aspects of the decline in a state, 
from its institutional and political capacities, to its social cohesion and 
economic performance. Failed or completely collapsed states can be 
effectively conceived as empty borders. No single authoritative administration 
holds sole territorial control, but instead warring factions compete for control 
within borders that remain internationally recognised. For other countries, 
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failed and failing states are widely perceived as security concerns, particularly 
if one is a neighbour with such a state. In the South Pacific, the term "failing" 
has been used to describe the Solomon Islands before the regional assistance 
mission RAMS! intervened. Its continued use to describe other countries in 
the region, such as Papua New Guinea or Fiji is controversial, mainly because 
the countries of the South Pacific are generally considered much more 
peaceful than those in other regions labelled failing. Importantly, the 
geographical nature of the region itself provides a vastly different strategic 
context to African and European failing states which are often situated in 
landlocked geographies. It follows on that if Pacific Island states do 
experience aspects of failure (as opposed to being completely collapsed or 
failed) then their incapacities would breed unique security implications for the 
South Pacific region. This thesis aims to discern what those implications are 
for New Zealand policy in the South Pacific region. The method used will be 
to assess seven countries (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) and their degree to which they measure 
up against twelve indicators of state failure. These indicators have been 
borrowed from the Fund for Peace's annual Failed States Index (with their 
permission) and they provide the structure for the assessment. 
To present this research, this thesis has been split into three sections with the 
first briefly outlining the central tenets of the concept of state failure followed 
by a literature review of the discussion of state failure in the South Pacific. In 
this first section there will also be a brief explanation of why the seven 
countries have been chosen, a brief outline of the twelve indicators, and a note 
on the sources used. The second section will be structured into twelve separate 
parts, as per the twelve indicators. Each part will have an explanation of the 
indicator, the research involved, and the importance of the findings. The third 
section will start with a brief summary of the findings of the indicators, as per 
country, followed by an account of the region's insecurities that can be put 
down to aspects of failure with South Pacific states. Finally, this thesis will go 
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into the implications these insecurities have for New Zealand policy and 
aspirations in the region. 
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